An internal assessment of the Ontario Liberal party electoral readiness
A hard look at what the Ontario Liberal party had to do if it hoped to end finally the Progressive Conservative reign in Ontario
Note: This was written by Tom Zyzis, director of research for the Ontario Liberal caucus in early 1984, more than a year before the 1985 provincial election. It is important to understand the when it was written and the political context at that time.
It was before Progressive Conservative Premier Bill Davis’ shift on separate schools in June 1984, his resignation that October and the Tory leadership race and convention in January 1985. It was also drafted around the time of Trudeau père’s ‘walk in the snow’ on February 29, but before the arrival of John Turner as the new Liberal leader on June 16 and well before Mulroney’s huge victory on September 4. Finally it was almost a year before the December 13, 1984 Ontario provincial byelections in which the Liberals won only two of five seats up for grabs, including losing two they had held.
It looks at all aspects of the Liberal Party and its Opposition role with critical comments about how they were performing including the leader David Peterson. It underlines that there was an attempt in 1984 to focus the party on becoming the government. We have talked at times about how was it, particularly with the December by election defeats that the Party righted itself and became the government in June 1985. Tom’s note suggests at least a part of the ‘why’.
It was circulated to David Peterson, Hershell Ezrin, Vince Borg and George Hutchison.
At this point, the Liberal party was not just a reactive opposition that latched onto things in the media but was also pursuing policy research, particularly through task forces and issuing papers,. That helped build the party’s credibility in the year leading up campaigning for the May 2,1985 election.
Some thoughts on the current state of affairs – 1984
Introduction
I thought 1 might offer some personal observations about where we stand, some twelve months before a provincial election. This will be to some extent a rambling piece, thinking aloud as it were. As a general proposition, I intend to err on the side of negativism and pessimism; I would rather overestimate our weaknesses than overestimate our strengths.
I think we’re a close enough unit that I don’t have to apologize for any thoughts or criticisms that are presented in this paper. I offer this paper as a springboard for discussion and action to be taken. My views are entirely impressionistic and instinctual. My limitations are what I know about our operations, and consequently, especially in the areas of community relations and the OLP generally, I lack the wherewithal from which to comment intelligently.
In some cases, I will be commenting on problems or prescribing solutions that have already been identified. I do so to put these items in a broader perspective, as well as to reinforce what have become our better habits.
Current situation
My basic theory in simple terms is as follows: all things considered, when. DRP became leader, we did not have an explicit game plan, save for the principle that we must not make a serious mistake in DRP’s first six months (this was a carry over paranoia from Stuart Smith’s early days). That is not to say that we did not have certain implicit, semi-conscious goals: to build credibility, to raise DRP’s profile, to establish DRP’s “humanness”, to be the effective opposition to establish networks among interest groups, opinion leaders and the media, to build the party’s organization and re-fill sorely depleted coffers, to bring together a strong staff, in short, to have a strong, credible PRESENCE, all by means of patient, consistent, diligent yet highly active work. In two years, we have met most of our somewhat unarticulated objectives, in some cases quite surpassing them, in others, not falling too far behind them. That being said, had someone told me two years ago that we would have accomplished such achievements during this period, I would have naturally assumed we would also have attained the natural concomitant of these various successes, which is momentum. I offer this not as a criticism, but merely as a personal observation. We’ve gone very far, we’re not spinning wheels, but there is no sense of some imminent breakthrough now or on the horizon.
One could argue that to some extent, the current political environment (the focus on the federal scene, the lack of controversial issues at the provincial level, etc.) causes the current doldrums. If such is indeed the case, and if the malaise continues, then we’re letting external events constrain our ultimate objective. To overcome the status quo, we must react against it. More on this latter.
To put some perspective on our current state, let me offer some observations on the various facets of our operations.
DRP
He has exceeded all expectations of what was expected of him as Leader of the Official Opposition in the Legislature. This in large part accounts for the favourable reviews we received after his first year. Since then, as there has been but incremental improvement, the feeling is that he has reached a plateau, and it is not apparent to outsiders whether his incremental improvements are sufficient to allow him to be deserving of the office of the Premier.
In scrums and media interaction, DRP is hot and cold. He’s good when he not only understands the issue but when he has a feel, almost a personal attachment/involvement for it. When he does not fully understand the issue, or is not in the mood, he gives shallow facile answers, becomes inarticulate and is easily (and recognizably) flustered.
His personal relations with the media as a person (as opposed to as a politician) are relatively good to very good. However, he has a tendency towards informality that at times can make him so much like one the boys that he is unable, as a politician, to pretend to project the aura of a Premier.
The public view of DRP suffers from two major problems: one, his recognition factor is still low; this is understandable, or at least explainable; what is more disturbing is that neither DRP nor the Ontario Liberals ca.n easily conjure up in the public’s mind any strong image that they can identify, let alone relate to.
Among interest groups and opinion leaders, I believe DRP (and to a lesser though still encouraging extent, the party) has established a profile, one on average on the fair side of neutral. (To give the subjective eva uation some context, my own impressionistic view is that the NOP are also slightly to the positive side of neutral for this segment of the population, while the Tories are slightly to the negative side of neutral. We can debate this utterly unscientific view of interest groups ad nauseam, but these are my impressions. I include in this elitist group all interest groups, including labour, teachers, public interest groups, ethnics, business leaders, and editorial boards and special publications.)
Caucus
While there are perhaps slightly more than a half-dozen of really good caucus members, and another dozen good soldiers, this is actually good news. Fidel Castro started with less. DRP has unified the caucus, they are generally committed to all our current initiatives, and morale, as opposed to hopes for the next election,. is generally and consistently high. All told, we have the right people in the right critic areas, and with sufficient motivation and direction, this core group of eighteen or so has, does and could achieve a lot in terms of our ultimate goals. Currently, they are to some extent underutilized, but perhaps more to the point, they are not directed to the most appropriate activities. They are more sensible and contentious than their NOP counterparts, however not as knowledgeable on average about their issue areas as the NOP members. All told, I would say they arc still unfairly underrated by the press and underutilized by us.
General staff
A short comment about the general staff. No office is without its griping and politics, and so for myself personally it is hard to judge the sometimes petty, sometimes strongly held antagonism that exist among staff members.
There remains, I sense, below the senior staff level, resentments related, to lack of communication, of feedback, of sense of direction. People will gripe about who should be doing a certain task (is this a research or communications on community relations function); they will at one and the same time feel some are encroaching on their areas of responsibility while criticizing others for apparently not pulling their weight. Taking our entire operation as a whole, there is but a feeble sense of team spirit. We ourselves are still not as good managers as we think we are as we need to be, nor as we very frankly can be, but I think there have been significant improvements in this regard. My greatest concerns in this field are: the general staff don’t always know what’s wanted of them or where we’re going (sometimes we haven’t articulated it to ourselves, often because we don’t have the time to tell them or because we change priorities quickly) and consequently there is some frustration; we don’t delegate enough and consequently some are underutilized and others feel we don’t have sufficient confidence in their abilities; a concomitant of the latter communication problem and orders coming from on high syndrome is that some cynicism develops about the powers that be; while morale is fairly good, the’general staff as a whole would probably rate our chances of winning as low, and consequently one very important motivating factor i missing from their work – the one item which would normally separate them from other nine-to–fivers; lacking such a belief and feP.ling the goal of power likely unattainable,. they carry on as a group without a cause, a team without spirit – it may explain why, as a collectivity, the staff as a whole does not get charged up. On the other side of the ledger, because they are so close to the political process, they generally hate the Tories and/or have developed strong loyalties to their fellow-workers, which somewhat off-sets their pessimistic views of our (and their) chances; in some respects,. they’ve adopted the view of opposition members who have been out of power for too long: they’ll always put up “the good fight”, but finally, as. a general comment, the quality of the LA’s is quite uneven.
Senior staff
What more can be said after Nora McCabe’s article.? We’re good, we communicate very well with each other, we’re always continually learning_ Let me be especially brief here and expand more on my ideas in another section- I think we have to be crisper with respect to our meetings, our goals and on sticking to our goals.
Research
I cannot presume to comment in much depth on the staff of the other divisions. Let me say this about research: it has a reputation for solid, accurate work. The staff is loyal, generally hard-working, all those good attributes. Their weaknesses:. hesitant to promote new policies (either because they don’t feel part of the process, are too indoctrinated into a particular form of opposition researching, i.e., reactive criticism, or they’re too busy – on matters whose priorities could be open to question); generally, I think they have learned as a rule to react to us, and so often will await our suggestions for question period and policy ideas – in part this is a conditioned reflex; they have seen their ideas shot down because it didn’t fit into a general plan which we and DRP only subconsciously understand; they consequently do lack some confidence; they get a lot of dredge work for people who are also considered the best researchers (they read “brains”) since Stephen Lewis days; their political judgment is uneven, especially when gauged by our and DRP’s (I hate to repeat this) unarticulated yet intuitively understood (amongst ourselves) political judgment.
The how and why of our success
Picking up on the comment of the last section, I do not want to decry (like some Caucus members) that we do not have a plan. In truth, we have had many explicit plans and goals, but all told we have rarely followed through with them as diligently as our plans and goals would have required for them to be fully successful. (I will elaborate on this point later.) An analysis of our successes would show that we have relied on the fact that as a collectivity, namely the senior staff and DRP usually, we have fairly good political instincts, which has been reflected in our generally strong capacity to react quickly and effectively to suddenly breaking political events thrust onto the Queen’s Park agenda. In effect, we see these events in the context of that unarticulated game plan, that of strong and credible response, presence, etc.
Let me review some of our initiatives in a general way, with a few preliminary observations, and then some general conclusions.
In the area of items I would characterize as part of our game plan: DRP’s identification with women’s issues (pornography, assauit against women}: excellent anticipation, good execution of plan initially, primarily by means of the Legislature, the women’s perspective and mail-outs; the follow-through has been somewhat flat. When the government responded, we felt euchred (or eunuched?}, and took the low profile route ever since (our equal pay initiative was fortuitous, and continues to be handled by Copps and Wrye). Tenants: although initially prompted by the Cadillac-Fairview issue, the extensive brochure was a calculated endeavour, obviously successful (seeing as the other two parties quickly followed suit). Could one say that DRP has done much to identify himself with tenants recently?
The Task Forces: results, though uneven, are positive, though not excessively so. The Youth Task Force was a flop, though this was not Sweeney’s fault. The area was too large and complex, not enough thought was given to its goals; also, too few resources were allocated; the Health Care Task Force was a great success during its life-span; its aftermath resembles a whimper. The Rural Municipalities Task Force is a great success, largely because it is on-going and also because we are treating it the way it is supposed to be conducted, as a public relations exercise. Once the exercise stops, so will much of the reaction.
The Youth Program: great issue, great positive material, great execution, no follow through.
Some smaller issues: the 1983 pre-BILD Anniversary: good timing, good material, good execution. In terms of what our goals were, on a relative scale, one of our most successfully planned initiatives. The ODC’s: good pre-release setting up of the issue, poor execution (we were not focused, DRP was ill-prepared, misread the press, timing was wrong).
In the area of issues I would characterize as reactive: the trust companies affair: easily our most successful, most intensive from a research and execution point of view. We hung on long after everyone else got bored. Hydro: again, extensive research and execution, again, hung on too long. Wiseman/Gordon and Walker affairs: good, old–style provincial Liberal tactic – react, bite in until no more blood can be drawn; comparatively little research or communication effort, excellent use of Legislature (both House and committees).
There are two other issues I would like to mention, partly because they are so anomalous: the bilingualism question: this was an issue that should have been part of a planned strategy (our instincts failed us) and to some degree that explains why we stumbled rather badly. The issue of bilingualism cannot be one where one can expect to simply react; you’ve got to be there, feet planted firmly on the ground.
Closing of the DHC’s: this should have been simply a reactive issue, but we tried to make a game plan out of it, to establish a beachhead for DRP in the social policy field. We made an impact as far as the persons affected go, which is the reactive side of it, but as far as follow-up, we couldn’t, because there is no follow-up to an isolated event such as this. (Mary’s options for living project did not require the DHC event as a sine qua non).
What conclusions do I draw from all this? Hesitant ones, but here goes. Where we have a game plan, we do not follow through; where we react, we follow through too far. We concentrate so much on the “event”, or the simply raising of an issue (itself an event), yet we don’t plan the continuing steps. When we’ve decided on an initiative (i.e. devised a plan), we have done so because we perceived a vacuum, a political opportunity, an item that’s top of mind, a concern that’s deeply ingrained in the public’s amorphous sense of what’s important. That sort of judgment usually involves identifying a deep-rooted sensitivity on the part of the public. We raise the issue, touch that nerve, yet once that Liberal call to arms is shouted out, the echo we hear coming back is that of the government taking up the cause, not the Liberal initial sounding of the alarm. Yes, the government has a stronger voice, yes, the government can take action, yet I would submit that the underlyjng publi concern we have identified is so deeply ingrained that it would take a tr mendous amount of action to alleviate that concern. What the government normally does is just start talking about the issue (be it women’s issues or health). Oddly enough, words, not deeds suffice, yet we stop pressing when we feel the government react.
I may be somewhat harsh on ourselves or naive about the true capacity of the government to smother our message. Let us look at the obverse side of the coin: issues we react to. The trust companies’ affair and Hydro were hot issues, yet they are/were transitory precisely because there was no deep-seated concern among the public about trust companies or Hydro. The short-lived crisis has great newsworthiness for a while, but they are mere blips on the screen. We’re attracted to these bright blips like moths to a lightbulb, and unfortunately, in th public’s mind, when that bright blip is turned off, the moths disappear.
A word on scandal mongering
Having been labelled a scandal monger (in the noble Harold Greer sense of the term), I feel I should tackle this matter straight on. Scandals have brought down governments. Governments long in power tend to produce more scandals. Taking even the Ontario voter, I would agree that they do not like a scandal-riddled government, or one that reeks of complacency, patronage and staleness (these characteristics often come together). Take the example of the 1979 federal election: the Liberals, with many millstones, including Trudeau and a seeming inability to cope or even relate to unfolding crises, had a fair share of scandals: the judges affair, the Skyshops affair, etc. Take the 1975 provincial election: Fidinam, the Moog affair, etc. What lesson can we draw from these events? Allow me to jurnp one step. That the Ontario voter prizes competence and ability above all else. Joe Clark was rebuked in 1980, his honesty above reproach, his credibility beyond repair. What may well be the unlearned lesson of 1975 is that the Ontario Liberals, even accounting for a federal backlash and other factors, appeared disorganized, misread the public on people issues (with the exception of our anti regional government stand) and that the NOP, with a solid grasp of the public’s deep-seated needs and ability to respond to same, made impressive gains. Both opposition parties made gains because the public was upset with the Tories:, but the Liberals keyed on what the public was upset about, the NDP on what the public was concerned about. The Liberals consolidated and augmented their natural constituency; the NDP attracted a new one. (I may be speaking through my hat, even though I don’t own one, but that’s my impression of events).
Moreover, I don’t think anyone gives credit to those who expose the scandals, only blame the perpetrators. Who led the fight on the Skyshops affair, Fidinam, and so on? Can anyone remember? Do we believe the public will remember who led the fight on the trust companies’ affair or Hydro? The popular Canadian adage is that governments defeat themselves. Scandals will do th3.t – but not the hint of a scandal, but a veritable stench. There is no such stench in Ontario today.
I do not want to belittle our efforts in this area, and the concomitant field of government waste. In the latter case, we are not so much touching a public nerve as picking away at an irritating scab; sometimes it bleeds, but it takes a hell of a lot of picking to provoke a hemorrhage. (I trust no one is reading this over a meal.} This sort of issue requires momentum; there is inertia (following the aforementioned affairs, the provincial auditor’s reports; there are the bugaboos of the landbanks, Minaki, government advertising, Suncor, Hydro); we all know that Tory spending is out of control and wasteful; I don’t think the public does, and I have doubts that we have got the momentum going on this issue to the point that the public will readily identify the Tories with waste.
Let me make a comment here about observations, given that this memo is turning into a thesis. We allow to far too great an extent our perceptions to be influenced by our sources of input without balancing for what will be an obvious bias on the part of that source. Let me repeat that phrase in English this time. I would contend that we, because of the positions we occupy, get a distorted view of public opinion because we canvass the media reports like detectives, we move in circles that hold many of our same views (our office, the Party, insiders including the media) and we, as the opposition party, are approached by the disgruntled (interest groups, wronged individuals, etc.) Our friends and acquaintances will. twig to certain stories and relay their reactions because they know us and feel they have a vested interest in reviewing the performance of the Tory government. Indeed, we’ll often hear what we want to hear from them, and if they suffer from some misperceptions, we’ll correct them, and feel content that the rrpublic” record has been corrected. But what do their friends tell them, and that ring of people beyond? We hear about politics because we’re in politics; if we were dentists, we’d be knee-deep in attitudes towards dentists.
One final word about government waste. Everyone thinks all governments waste money, in fact, that politicians, by definition, waste money. Wetre also competing with the image of the federal government’s abusive wastefulness.
Lastly, just as a matter of practice, scandals and government waste are the hardest items to research. It would be an onerous task indeed to try and make a definitive game plan in this area that would be decisively fruitful. This is an area that is largely a reactive role on the part of opposition parties.
Get to the point, Zizys
Let me summarize some of the foregoing. In two years, we have gone far towards perfecting our role as an opposition party. Indeed, we think and act like an opposition party, rarely like a party ready and able to take power. We react with righteous indignation towards injustice, folly, and given our provincial party’s heritage, towards scandal and waste. We are learning how to develop strong policies, but we have difficulty handling them, or knowing what to do with them.
The reaction that we persist in is not entirely futile. Our “being there, for the caterers, for the DHC’s, in towns across the province through our task forces and other visits, creates goodwill, strengthens our presence, highlights the official opposition. Getting media coverage every day is part of that same mentality. We eagerly proclaim “This is what David Peterson says”, while a bewildered electorate reacts, “David Peterson is saying something. Who is he? What does he stand for?” By trying to be everywhere every time, by trying thus to be all things to all people, we are becoming professional gadflies. We are becoming a professional opposition party, as opposed to merely an ordinary opposition party. The worst thing about a professional opposition party is that it lets external events (primarily the government and fortuitous circumstances like company collapses and bursting Zirconium tubes) set its agenda.
I suppose at bottom line my own instincts tell me that if we persist. in this approach, then we are doomed to achieving the honourable though less than optimal goal of being a good opposition party. We can continue to chip away, but the Tories have been too good at ultimately diffusing a crisis. Moreover, our capacity to create “opposition” issues that are voter-sexy, significant, etc., is limited because our sources of information are spotty, infrequent, or inaccessible.
Chipping away has its merits, but after two years, we have not gotten all that far towards the goal of forming a government having gone down this mad. Trying to keep ourselves in the public eye is another version of chipping away when all we do is choose any item that may give us some decent coverage vith any group. It has some value in terms of raising our recognition factor, but I question its ultimate capability, without appropriate and concerted focus,. as a mechanism for getting us to power.
What I am advocating is that we, to a far, far greater extent, set and stick to our own agenda. I realize that we cannot ignore the political and media context of our work – that we are expected to react. However, our preoccupation with reacting has prevented us, by drawing away our attention, resources and planning, from following through on our own planned initiatives. The Ontario provincial voter has not tired of the Tory government because he/she has not had anything to compare it to. In simple terms, we have to start concentrating more on ideas and themes, not the slings and arrows of opposition outrage.
One thing I find appealing about setting our own agenda is that for all intents and purposes, the government does not appear to have one. It has been content to drift, certainly during these last few years, if not the last six or eight or what have you. They survive on the basis of certain myths (good managers, practical and cautious, never outrageous, comfortable).
Indeed, some of these myths, like that of “comfortable”, are attractive to a population beset by crises and uncertainty. By calling the Tories smug, we come close to actually highlighting one of their attributes -unflappability. So long as we drift as well, tossing the odd rock in their direction, we will never significantly change our position relative to theirs.
Therefore, I think we must advocate specific themes which we identify, either through our collective pofrtical instincts and through polling, and repeat them till we’re sick o.f hearing them, repeat them till the word David Peterson and/or Ontario Liberal is synonymous with those themes.
In many respects, we have been moving towards this direction, and a strong foundation exists for expanding our i,1.itiatives in this regard. Most significantly, we have begun to go beyond the forum of the Legislature, by means of task forces, the radio clips, mailings, to get our message out. By having planned certain initiatives, we have a background of experiences from which to draw on to finally execute this option properly.
All told, the Legislature cannot be for us the forum through whim we can expect to expound our positive views. We can continue to incorporat. positive alternative concepts in our questions, make policy announcements through press conferences and releases, but we have to go outside th House to sell the message. This we have begun to learn. Before I carry on to far, let me at least deal briefly with our role in the Legislature.
The Legislature
Above all else, we must remember that the Legislature is primarily a forum for reaction. We must continue to use it that way, and indeed, improve our focus on committee hearings (especially public accounts). Despite the fact that the Legislature is a reactive forum, we have not been game-planning our strategy as much as we had in DRP’s first year. Perhaps it has been the lack of controversial legislation and a certain drift on the part of the government, but we have not shaken up the House as we did on the Suncor and Miller tax filibusters. The government dodged the Legislature very effectively on the trust companies’ affair by initiating studies, knowing the issue would die. The same has happened with Hydro. We have learned that when a fire erupts, we have to fan it. The government deals with a crisis by putting th resolution of that crisis into the near to medium future (the need to await a report, etc.). We must try to keep the crisis current, sending more issues to committees, forcing those committees to address our concerns now and if they don’t cooperate, ask for quorum calls, adjourn to the next day, prolong the crisis, send the item to another committee.
All this blabber on my part leads to recommendation number one: we need to institute a body, composed of members and staff, that coordinates our legislative presence. We need to focus on our objectives in the Legislature, we need to know what opportunities exist, which we can create, and we need the wherewithal to make decisions and follow-through with them. From a caucus point of view, I would suggest at the very least we need Nixon as House Leader, Conway,. and Pat Reid as public accounts Chairman on such a committee. From a staff point of view, Moira definitely, probably myself and very preferably someone from communications. Such a committee would have to meet once a week, either Monday or Friday (preferably Monday). If the government is going to do anything in the House, this is the year it will have to do it. We have to slow them down without being too obstructionist while advocating our own political agenda aggressively.
This sort of strategy has its cumulative impact without our having to appear obstructionist. Any bill which we are presented with which could legitimately (or near legitimately) require some public input we should send to committee. Any major issue which deserves public airing should deserve an emergency debate or be sent to committee. If the Tories wish to debate whether these items should be the subject of committee consideration, let’s debate it, let’s draw the time out, let’s have those bills heard, let’s not allow them to cut any time from estimates, let’s make our speeches 10% longer in the House and in committees. Slowly, inexorably, the Tories will be squeezed. When a real crisis develops, we will be able to come out with both guns blazing, stall everything, demand and fully expect concessions. We may not have the right to order the agenda of the House, but we certainly have the right, as the government-in-waiting, not to be run over roughshod by a government intent of making a big splash in its final legislative year.
In addition, as the pressure grows, so will the siege mentality. The government will abuse its majority situation, they, I firmly beiieve, will become impatient, and being arrogant and believing in their divine right to govern, they will make mistakes. The Chinese once tried to avert a great rice shortage by asking everyone to eat one less mouthful of rice a day. We can corner the governmeri:, by having our members speak one more mouthful a day.
What are these magical policy alternatives?
Looking back on what has been written so far, I do apologize for harping on the obvious, downplaying what we’ve done well, and ignoring what strides we have taken already to establish a policy focus to DRP’s and the party’s image.
The federal Tories are very impressively scoring strong points against the government using almost exclusively reactive issues (they are being very ably assisted by a government severely overcome by a death wish, to wit Lalonde’s ignominy, the tax revenue fiasco, etc.) The provincial Tories cannot be expected to be so helpful to our cause. (Indeed the success of their federal brethren reinforces the view of Tories generally as honest managers.)
Nevertheless, I concede that we must continue to include reactive opposition party criticism among our arsenal of political tactics. The real issue, as I stated before, is how we manage our resources so that we do not detract from the very important goal of establishing the Ontario Liberals as the alternative government, as opposed to the best opposition party.
We have for a long time, identified the policy fields we need to promote, and have worked hard towards generating a policy aura to our image. These issues are:
- opportunities for youth, both in education and employment
- women’s issues
- a realistic approach to the new economic realities
- efficient and caring social policies
- resources policies that promote not merely preservation of our environment but ones that effectively husband our natural resources
- responsible and responsive government
Our approaches must be forward-looking, but not futuristic (as in 1990 or 21st century prescriptions). They must stress leanness over meanness. Responsible government means not only eliminating waste, corruption, patronage and unnecessary red tape, but responsiveness through freedom of information, privacy laws, and a respected legal process.
It is interesting because in the context of Ontario’s political idelogical environment, by this form of nee-democrat approach, we are trying to appeal to voters who usually vote either NDP or Tory. This at first app ars to be contradictory, trying to attack both wings from the centre. Not having the luxury of a sophisticated poll analysis, we must nevertheless give serious thought as to why the NDP vote goes to the Tories and vice versa, depending on general trends, rarely stopping with us. Could it not be a simple case of a schizophrenic electorate wanting both fiscal conservatism and humanistic social objectives, opting for stronger people issues (as in tenant issues, environmental issues, worker safety, helping the disenfranchised, preserving neighbourhoods) in 1975, and swinging to a strong management preference (BILD being very much a “we’ve got a firm hold at the helm”) in 1981? The federal Liberal success is based on a broad centre, left of centre strength. the provincial Liberal profile is fragmented: we hold pockets that are left of centre, centre and right of centre, yet we do not occupy the broad centre. Our challenge is to hold our historical base, and and promote policies which attract voters who like the NOP ideals yet £ind the party as a whole incapable of providing pragmatic stewardship and at the same time attracting voters who like the Tories as managers but who are finding them stale.
DRP’s most promising identity, which is still evolving, that of the caring businessman, is our strongest asset. This image, above all else, remains our best vehicle for promoting our fresh ideas. There is no doubt that our tone must be positive, aggressively optimistic, a sort of “talking proud” Ontario approach. To be jingoistic in a Madison Avenue sense, he theme is “Ontario, you’ve got what it takes. Let’s go for the gusto!”
Electoral realities
Before I go too far down this road, let me deal.with our right of centre constituency. Firstly, any of our new policy approaches cannot radically undercut the sensibilities of these voters. (Generally speaking, I think we have a good handle on this). Secondly, a good number of the sea ts we hold on the basis of this fragment of the electoral spectrum are by virtue of personal fiefdoms. We must ensure that these members have strong organizational and financial support that they can continue to hold these seats. Where we expect retirements, we must have candidates in place who can draw votes on the basis of their personal appeal, and that the current incumbent is as strongly identified with that candidate’s campaign as possible. Thirdly, our agricultural caucus and the rural municipalities task force must be used to strengthen our hold on those seats and also to concentrate on other targeted seats where we are expecting to draw on the same small “c” conservative constituency. These are our major vehicles. DRP should not have to be used in these efforts, and indeed, his personal identification with this target could undercut the image we are trying to set for him on the broader provincial level. To sum up, these areas must e the focus of a concerted effort on th part of certain caucus members, with a reasonable level of staff support, but that DRP himself should be used elsewhere, except for the occasional courtesy call. The seats I am talking about are:
Brant-Oxford-Norfolk (L-Nixon)
Chatham-Kent (PC-Watson)
Elgin (PC-McNeil)
Erie (L-Haggerty)
Essex North (L- Ruston)
Essex South (L-Mancini)
Frontenac-Addington (L-McEwen)
Haldimand-Nor folk (L-Miller) Halton-Burlington (L-Reed) Hastings-Peterborough (PC Pollock)
Huron-Middlesex (L-Riddell)
Huron-Bruce (L-Elston)
Grey (L-McKessock)
Grey-Bruce (L-Sargent)
Kent-Elgin (L-McGuigan)
Lambton (PC-Henderson)
Lincoln (PC-Andrewes)
Middlesex (PC-Eaton)
Niagara Falls (L-Kerrio)
Oxford (PC-
these efforts, and indeed, his personal identification with this target could undercut the image we are trying to set for him on the broader provincial level. To sum up, these areas must e the focus of a concerted effort on th part of certain caucus members, with a reasonable level of staff support, but that DRP himself should be used elsewhere, except for the occasional courtesy call. The seats I am talking about are:
Brant-Oxford-norfolk (L-Nixon)
Chatham-Kent (PC-Watson) Elgin (PC-McNeil)
Erie (L-Haggerty) Essex North (L-Ruston) Essex South (L-Mancini)
Frontenac-Addington (L-McEwen)
Haldimand-Nor folk (L-Miller) Halton-Burlington (L-Reed)
Hastings-Peterborough (PC-Pollock)
Huron-Middlesex (L-Riddell)
Huron-Bruce (L-Elston)
Grey (L-McKessock)
Grey-Bruce (L-Sargent)
Kent-Elgin (L-McGuigan)
Lambton (PC-Henderson)
Lincoln (PC-Andrewes)
Middlesex (PC-Eaton)
Niagara Falls (L-Kerrio)
Oxford (PC- Treleavan) Perth (L-Edighoffer)
Peterborough (PC-Turner)
Prescott-Russell (L-Boudria)
Quinte (L-O’Neil)
Renfrew South (PC-Yakabuski) Renfrew North (L-Conway)
S-D-G (PC-Villeneuve)
St. Catharines (L-Bradley)
Victoria-Haliburton (L-Eakins)
Wellington-Dufferin-Peel (PC-Johnson) Wellington South (L-Worton)
This is a sizable number 0£ seats (30), nineteen of which are currently Liberal the other eleven Tory. Five of these sitting Liberal members (apart from securing their own seats) need not be used for targeting in this area, their goals are different: Conway (deputy leader and post-secondary school issues);_ Bradley (education and government waste); Reed (natural resources and the north); Elston (environment); and Mancini (labour). These individuals are good pinch hitters in other areas as well (the north, etc.)
A word on three south-western urban areas, Kitchener-Waterloo, London and Windsor. Of the nine seats represented here, seven are Liberals, one Tory, one NDP. DRP’s forays into south-western Ontario should concentrate on these areas as media centres and fund-raising sources. Our seats are strong here; Epp is a natural strength for our rural municipalities task force, Van Horne we need for the north, Wrye for our social policy presence, Sweeney for our education/manpower/industry thrust, Breithaupt for solid justice/commercial and financial issues.
As far as the Ottawa area goes, that remains, as far as I can tell, a question of presence, primarily through DRP, Conway and Roy. I have no feel whatsoever for specific policy themes £or this area, though I appreciate we have a chance in Ottawa Centre (NDP-Cassidy) and Carleton-East (PC-McQuarrie).
Taking these areas and their ridings as a whole, we are talking about forty-one seats, twenty-seven of which are currently Liberal. Assuming we held onto all our seats and won half of the targets, that would give us thirty-four seats.
Obviously we hav.e to write off that great swath of Tory seats across central Ontario. I have serious doubts about any inroads we can make in that ring of Tory seats around Metro Toronto. That leaves us with Hamilton (and surrounding area) – seven seats, the North – fifteen seats, and Metro Toronto – twenty-nine, a total of fifty-one seats, of which we now hold five, the NOP seventeen, the Tories twenty nine. We probably have to gain at least twenty to twenty-five new seats in these areas to form a government. (This is not taking into account redistribution.)
I am sorry I got carried away with this electoral analysis (crass indulgence for a policy analyst – unfortunately, I was staring at an electoral map while writing this). The sum of this digression is: consolidate and augment our liberal right of centre base, using existing caucus strength, and make significant inroads in the metropolitan regions of Toronto and Hamilton-Wentworth, as well as the North.
The practical means of achieving these goals
By this point you’re all probably saying we all know this Zizys, tell us how to do it. Well hold on, I’m just getting warmed up. Our four major obstacles to achieving our policy orientation goal are:
- the generation of new policy initiatives
- the generation of events to highlight these initiatives (with the dissemination of our policy included in this)
- the current limitations of our resources
- the coordination of all the
In the last few months, I must admit we have improved the focus of DRP’s trips. A location is chosen, and then the appropriate researchers are contacted for event ideas, following the themes we are trying to put forward. We have for some time now done extensive mailing to special interest media (including editorial boards) and to interest groups, opinion leaders and targeted specific-issue affected individuals. As we endeavour to increase these activities (which we must, if we are to get our positive message across), the current system will not work.
The computer system will help immensely with respect to our mailings (I would strongly urge that special interest media be our first lists entered into the computer, because they can disseminate our information through an audience far wider than any of our other mailing lists). In addition, the new paper procedure for coordinating DRP’s events I feel is a great administrative advance. Our major weaknesses remain the generation of ideas and of events, rooted primarily in the limits of our resources.
Let me review what is currently being expected of researchers: new policies; reactive research; press releases; identifying events usually after DRP’s tour has been set; responding to the flotsam and jetsam sent down to them by DRP, Shirley and the members; this is all while the House is in recess. Come the resumption of the Legislature, question period and Committees eat up more than half of their time. Their capacity to do the aforementioned work for DRP’s trips will once again be severely curtailed.
What of the community relations department? They act as field workers, scheduling DRP’s and others’ trips, keeping tabs with the party. They have a general sense of what policies we have promoted, a limited sense of what research is currently working on (though this is improving as our themes are crystallizing), and little capacity to identify new potential events that may fit into an evolving game plan. In truth, while research has developed a fairly good working relation with the communications department, the relationship with “our outside the House” activities agenda is relatively weak.
Going back to the research side of things, we must concede that each researcher has his or her own strengths and weaknesses. We must play to those strengths and supplement those areas where they are weak. Ideally, we are looking for the research staff to produce ideas and generate (or at least assist in the generation) of events. Not all of them are suited to, nor should all be expected to perform such tasks, especially when they are particularly strong in one or the other aspects of their work.
Let me, from a research perspective, propose the following identification. of tasks.
Firstly, with respect to our right of centre riding objectives. Gary Sands is doing a good job on the rural municipalities task force. We must promote the hell out of this, and the follow-through on rural municipalities issues. We should allow the use of Sandie as an assistant to this task force, the rest of her time to be taken up with members requests including a limited range of estimates work (for members like Eakins, Haggerty, etc.) (This in effect is simply acknowledging the status quo.) Finally, Lou shold focus 90% of his attention on agriculture issues, coordinating not only policy but touring and speaking engagements as well as speechwriting and articles for agricultural media. These two management decisions in themselves would take care of 90% of the demands of roughly half of our caucus. These individuals should be informally, if not formally, identified as one of the components of a caucus research core. If there are specific time crunches in this area, short-term contract assistance should be able to ease the burden. More sophisticated contract work could be directed to special areas of concern to these members, in particular tourism and small business. Given that these issues are important components of an economic strategy, they complement our central themes very well and should be encouraged.
Gary Gallon is a very good researcher and events creator. In effect, with Lou targeted on agriculture, his areas of responsibility will be extended to include environment, energy, natural resources and the north. Lou will only be able to pinch hit to a limited extent here, Gallon will need high-class contract assistance intermittently to cover specific items like certain dump site problems) a forestry strategy, water quality issues). The two new field workers in the North must pitch in with some research ideas, but primarily identifying events. Because not a small number of members’ concerns relate to environmental issues (Kerrio-Niagara Falls, Haggerty-wetlands issue and waste management, Epp-Uniroyal, etc), extra assistance here will help with our members’ demands, while at the same time we can concentrate on identifying DRP very closely with environmental, natural resource and northern issues. Basically, here we have Gallon, the two part-timers in the North, a part-time natural resource (in the broad sense) generalist, and Lou with intermittent pinch-hitting.
Phil is too good a researcher to have him worry about creating events. His current projects include adding a private sector component to our youth program, developing our new industrial strategy, pre-Budget preparations. these are some of our most important areas. Phil should get direct assistance and guidance from senior staff both for ideas generation and events creation. In particular, he should not have to concern himself with the latter.
In the area of public accounts, despite their already important tasks, we have to rely on Phil assisted by Sands to cover this Committee. Mary is overloaded. She has a policy paper “Options for Living” to prepare, she has two of the most demanding critics (Wrye and Copps), she has two of the largest policy fields to cover (Health and COMSOC), and we expect to have DRP establish a presence in this area, presumably through her efforts. This is not a realistic workload. If I am not mistaken, Wrye will be getting an intern, however, I would not expect that an intern can be expected to alleviate much of this load. Indeed, I would strongly urge that the intern concentrate on women’s issues (an area that we can really begin to push again with significant effort when our Waterloo Co-op students, Cathy McBride and Camela Allsop, return in May. In particular, McBride could develop a day care strategy £or us, having already written an extensive paper on it.) Mary needs, if not a full-time assistant in this area, strong part-time help, again, particularly so that we can work on the creation of events. Mary is good at both research and event creation, but in the final analysis, it is more important that the regular researcher focus more on issues. In addition, some caucus research contract funds could be used for some social policy items we haven’t seriously considered yet, e.g. denticare.
Sara’s positon is an interesting one. While nominally responsible for urban issues, a number of these items have been de facto delegated away: transportation issues are handled through Cunningham’s assistant, Levir.e, and Sands is handling many non-Toronto urban concerns. This should be encouraged. Sara has been preoccupied with tenant issues and homeowners’ assessments in Metro. She has a fair number of members’ requests, some of which could be trnnsferred to Sandie and Sands. She should concentrate on Metro, and one possible suggestion is that she work with Mary to help create social policy events for DRP, Wrye and Copps in Metro (and elsewhere, but particularly Metro). Sara, I think, could be well-suited for this, because she is both project orientated and events orientated.
In addition, she knows her way around Metro and has good networks. In effect, we could use her more a a community relations type and fill the policy gaps with contract assistance. We have to give her more direction generaily with respect to Metro issues, regardless of whether a good portion of her time is given over to identifying social policy events. (All told, I don’t think a Metro strategy revolves around issues like the Dome, the Spadina expressway or the Toronto Islands. Metro is so large that we should be hitting it full blast with our large themes: youth opportunities in education and employment, options for living, etc).
Carol has developed strong networks with the various professional interest groups in the education field. To some extent, the formulation of her outlook is akin to the type of relationship that develops over time between a regulatory body and the regulated industry; just as a regulatory body becomes “captured” by the regulated industry, Carol thinks in terms of the interests of the client groups in the educational field.
More often than not, these views are what are in the public interest, however Carol has the tendency to conceptualize and short-form these views from the perspective of a professional in the field. That’s good and important, and explains our good rapport with the important interest groups. (I do not in any way want to belittle the very good work done by Bradley and Conway.) Moreover, Carol has a handle on the issues. Our task, frankly my task as a manager, is to build the bridge between her concepts and the political message we send out to the public at large. All-in-all, Carol can handle this area. Her work for the manpower/training initiative needs the same sort of guidance. This is one initiative we have to do right. As a political thrust, it is very broad and in some cases, rather deep. It will take a senior staff level effort to make sure we stage this initiative properly.
Indeed, I should interject here and make some reflections on both the manpower /training and options for living initiatives. We would be expecting to much of the researchers to put the total research, communications and even ts package together on these issues, given their complexity. The campaigns conducted for these issues should be a regular item for each senior staff meeting. We have to take on the responsibility of making the thing fly. The researcher should primarily focus on providing the material.
Mordechai is to some extent an ideas person, but more so, he’s an ideals person. Unfortunately, he is weighed down with many constituency-type concerns (he is most clearly identified as the lawyer on staff, and because he is so approachable, he gets a fair number of requests that are of a social worker /legal aid case type). I personally had this same problem when I occupied the Justice position on the research staff, though fortunately I was not so affable as to get overloaded with these items. (Many I threw away.) Mordechai definitely has to throw himself more into the field of occupational health and safety and WCB, and it may be that some contract work could be used to help establish the initial network among groups in this field that Mordechai can then exploit from a research perspective. What I’m saying is Mordechai could use some community liaison assistance, which could also overlap into the other justice fields (especially human rights). Our thrust in Mordechai’s area should be a Metro-directed, multi-cultural orientation. Sara could help to some extent, but we need stronger, grass-roots approaches among the visible minorities and the Mediterranean and South American communities.
To sum up, from the perspective of the needs of the research department generally, I would see requirement for strong part-time help in. the en7ironment field, and some extra assistance in the social policy field (in addition to how Sara’s is directed and what caucus contract work can be directed this way},- and some grass-roots networking in the workers• and human rights issues among Metro ethnic communities.
This does not fully, in my mind, fill our gaps in the ideas and events generation areas. The caucus research contract concept should help here. In particular, these contracted individuals should be required to not only propose policy, but also establish the networks, create a limited number of events, and develop a critical path for how we exploit the issue from start to finish. Obviously, they will need strong political and managerial assistance in these regards. They in ef£ect, however, must do much of the “outside 0£ the Legislature” work that some of the researchers either do not have the time to do or whose time is better spent performing other tasks. On the other side of the coin, this work is difficult to do for the community relations people because this is very issue-orientated.
The community relations staff should be concerned with the “grander strategy”, higher level general networking and event generation, party and fund-raising concerns, etc.
There still remains a gap, in my opinion, in terms 0£ grass roots contacts among ethnic communities in Metro. I believe we need some eyes and ears at that level, ones that could work at a street level frankly, who could relay issue concerns to the research office help identify events, attract new people/workers to the party, basically help in establishing a presence among that amorphous wide-ranging melange of cultures in Metro. In some respects, they would p rform a similar function to our part-time workers being proposed in the North. In the case of Toronto, they would have to be ethnics, people-orientated, with the capacity to both listen and be noticed.
I realize to some extent this may sound hairy fairy (or is it artsy fart.-rsy?), but I for one would be quite prepared, on an experimental basis, up, while community relations is working from the top down. It may sound unorthodox, but there ls, I propose, merit in reaching out to the up-and-co;-ners in these communities, the new wave of the new Canadians, those who would have the time and inclination to involve themselves in mainstream politics, those who in effect could create cells within the various communities which could draw like-minded individuals, as opposed to relying solely on the overextended, sometimes patriarchal and politically cautious old guard establishment of these same ethnic groups. We could be pleasantly surprised; if it doesn’t work, we can simply redirect the financial allotment to our traditional form of community networking. Frankly, if we are to win seats from the NDP in Metro, this could well cut them off at the knees.
A word on the timing of policy initiatives
The Ontario Liberal Party has come a long way in terms of establishing a policy basis to its image. The research team, since Stuart Smith days, had slo Y!y been building credibility, and under DRP it has achieved a respectable reputation. We as an opposition party have confidence and ability to react strongly to issues. More recently, we have begun proposing positive alternatives. We have, in this regard, still to pay our dues, in the sense that the Ontario Liberals are still not a policy force to contend with. What I mean is that we still have to establish ourselves as knowing what we’re talking about when we’re dealing with the “big issues”. The Health Care Task Force and the Youth Program (and even the trust companies affair and Hydro) have shown we’ve got brains. The options for living and manpower training initiatives should go a considerable way further to help establish such an image. This is where we are and what’s in the works for the near future (spring session).
While we always want to appear full of ideas, I do believe some thought has to be given to how we proceed once we have established that intellectual credibility as a party. This is a strategic issue; I would recommend that our future policy initiatives involve more telegraphing, more pre-networking with the affected constituencies, and that the release of our later policies be staged in increasingly concentrated intervals in the fall of 1984. We should, during this period, start seeing if we can begin lining up endorsements from various interest groups, or at the very least, ensuring that interest groups that are normally with the NDP or the Tories become openly ambivalent about their allegiances. Except for the labour movement as a whole, I think it is quite conceivable that we can be perceived as “acceptable” to everyone ranging from environmentalists to small business.
Once we have established ourselves as intellectually serious with our “big issue” credible alternatives, it will be far easier to propose policies, even small policies, because our credentials will be secure. Let me give an illustration: the NDP can spend more time raising case studies in the social policy field because people know where they’re coming from; we have greater difficulty and indeed feel sometimes uncomfortable doing this because we do it without a context, almost in a policy vacuum. For that reason, it has been, and still is to some extent, important to produce that big policy piece. It’s in that sense that I meant we have to pay our dues. In that regard, DRP’s view that we have to start doing shorter, more surgical-type policy pieces is right; we’ve just about established that credibility, and the policy momentum will become easier.
This is where the caucus contract frund becomes important. It may seem like a minor point, but if that fund is $50,000 better we have seventeen $3000 shots than ten $5,000 shots. If a particular initiative is promising, we can add more money to it. Three thousand dollars is probably five to six weeks’ work. That’s an incredibly long period in pure research terms. Anyone who’s got a B.A. can write an nA” paper in three to four weeks. If we’re contracting people near the expertise level of our research staff (which, when I say “near”, is quite a probability), then five to six weeks should suffice, for researching, writing, and with our guidance, staging the propagation of the policy initiative. (Consider the other case; $5,000 is close to ten weeks’ work.) If I can be a blind optimist for a moment, consider what sort of impact and sense of momentum the release of one policy initiative seventeen weeks in a row would do, in addition to the regular work we produce. (I appreciate that some of these contracts will be duds, and some will be to help members clear up inconsequential paperwork backlogs. Okay. Imagine then the same thing for eleven weeks in a row!)
The senior staff
Remember what a short paragraph I had on the senior staff at the beginning of this piece? That’s because everything from there to here has been a description of what we will have to get started, organized, directed, managed and concluded.
It would be trite to say we have a difficult task ahead of us. Were it just a case of technical management, putting this block in that hole, it would still not be easy. Unfortunately, we’re dealing in that environment we’re all too familiar with: the one where no surprise is the biggest surprise, where every simple assignment has its headaches and heartaches. Much of what I’ve put to paper here I believe Is part of that unarticulated game plan we have been following. Our difficult job will be trying to stick to this, or any other version of a game plan. Our even more difficult job will be keeping the staff motivated, focused, and believing.
If, as I propose, we need to now expand our poicy base and presence, in a planned fashion, then we have to manage our energies and husband our resources so that we do not try to chase down every avenue. We will have to be far stricter in making the judgment whether we have the resources available to take on that chase; is getting today’s matcher as important as tomorrow’s headline? Maybe we should be following the morning headlines more for our question period initiatives, it that’s what the gallery wants, with less research, and devote more time to setting our own policy agenda, one which eventually, with proper management, will become tomorrow’s morning headline, a headline that will not only be important to us, and to the gallery, but to that great mass we’re trying to reach with that set agenda. We’ve shown a lot of “desire” (a hockey term) in our capacity to react; perhaps we should exercise some discipline in what we choose to and to what extent we react.
This could, to some extent, alleviate some of the, I dare say, serious problems at the general staff level. People need to know what’ expected of them; in a way, we do tell them – to exaggerate slightly, we want everything; in a perfect world, we’d want them to know what we want from them before we ask them. If we have defined a task, for God’s sake, let’s try and let them stick to it. We all know this field requires flexibility and puts a premium on instantaneous reaction, but let’s pu.t some parameters on that flexibility and reaction. We cannot put a 100% effort into reaction work and a 100% effort into planned tasks.We have to determine what that balance will be. Certainly as far as the research staff goes, the directives that come down to them by or through me and others are sometimes unguided missiles. More and more when I listen to researchers use the ptu·ase ttthe senior staff”, I hear a tone in their voices one would use when referring to, a distant collectivity in a foreign land who has a tremendous capacity to affect every here and now event. I know it’s my job to tell them and explain what we’re doing, but I think we have to articulate a bit more to ourselves precisely what it is we’re doing.
I feel that to a similar degree, the same gap exists between the senior staff and other branches of the general staff. We can bemoan the fact that they don’t understand u and our direction, but, as little as I know about management theory, the ultimate responsibility for making sure a message is understood rests with the manager and not the subordinate. We ignore the problems of poor communication and disgruntled staff at our own peril.
Our relationship with caucus is a dicey one. We are their support staff in theory, and in practice they ultimately have to carry out the strategy, but in between this concept of support and action, the direction that action and support takes comes often from the senior staff, acting legitimately under the mandate of DRP’s leadership and authority. I think we have done fairly well in respecting the authority of caucus, and have not abused the advantageous position that a tightlyfocused staff can have over a diffused political collectivity like a caucus.
Again, as in the case of the general staff, the caucus needs to know where the party and DRP are headed. Moreover, they have to feel part of the process. Our initiatives in the right of centre constituency areas are crucial as is involving the very able political talents of this portion of our caucus. The youth Program simultaneous announcement more than any other initiative should be a lesson to us regarding the extent to which all our caucus can carry a serious, innovative policy message across the province. From my own personal experience with that campaign, I can’t help but remember how diligently and seriously someone like Eddy Sargent took his message to Owen Sound. He was as excited as a fifteen year old going out on an overnight hike. One has to be proud of that sort of motivation and enthusiasm, and we have to learn from those experiences. Similarly, the dedication of the members of the Rural Municipalities Task Force is very heartening.
We can task these members more. However, we have to get them the opportunities, encourage them to use up their flight monies, see if we cannot get those who are not using their full constituency money allotments to hire part-time constituency workers who could reduce, even by a fraction, the load that falls on LA’s and the research staff with regards to local requests. (These people will also form the core of election help. They can be doing the kitchen research for neighbouring targeted ridings, local newspaper clippings for question period issues and identification of events for tour purposes.)
If caucus knows where we’re going, the caucus research fund allotment will be that much more likely to be directed towards research that fits the general game plan. When caucus is involved in the process of formulating that policy, it becomes easier to get our message to the public through them. And as that message becomes more pervasive and directed, caucus will feel the involvement, the advances we’re making; the best way to put down griping is to be successful; nothing succeeds like success.
DRP
DRP prides himself on his drive and discipline. He’s got to become more disciplined and more focussed. He has to start acting like a Premier. And he has to start acting more, period. It’s our job to help-him meet these objectives.
From time to time, we do engage in image-counselling. I don’t think anyone can take that sort of constant image modelling for long without becoming chagrined. We are not trying to change him, but only the image he presents. A Premier does not rock on his feet when he talks. A Premier does not carry on about the deal he got ten years ago on $4 Hong Kong shirts. A Premier does not wing it. A Premier does not carry on like a good old boy with the press.
Let’s face it, the role of a Premier is an act. DRP put a lot of effort into improving his ability to put across an image when he ran for the party leadership. By trial and error, he eventually became comfortable with the role of Leader of the Official Opposition. That’s the plateau he’s reached, and that’s the plateau we as an organization have reached. We’ve all become comfortable in our roles. We have secured a niche, and that’s why we feel a sense of drift. Ve’ve stopped challenging ourselves. We’re smug knowing the NOP are Iar behind, and the Tories are somewhat within striking distance. As time slips by, our ability to make up that distance will become harder and soon impossible.
DRP has changed his image physically. Being a rumbled activist just lately converted to dress pants, I feel I should be the last to speak, but DRP has got to have a Premier’s wardrobe. I would strongly urge that DRP take a course in presentation technique for television and indeed general platform presence. We all know he’s improved; there’s no reason why he shouldn’t accelerate his improvement rate through special video session practices. No one can ever delude themselves into thinking they can’t improve or can’t learn more. To be philosophical about it, that is the essence of life. To be political about it, that is the essence of winning. That is the discipline of this art we call politics.
DRP’s penchant for informality is also the source of his tendency to wing it. It’s this sense of “take me J.s I am, I am a real person.” Real people don’t have to act, Premiers do. We as a staff have fallen down in our role of briefing DR P after question period for scrum purposes. We have to concentrate more on establishing what the message is in question period, but even more so, what the fifteen second clip is for the scrum. That again is the discipline of this art.
If we are to proceed forward with a stronger policy thrust, DRP has to devote more time to familiarizing himself with the research material provided him. DRP has a businessman’s approach to briefing – give me the bare facts. In scrums, he will attempt to use his considerable natural wits to respond to questions that focus on the fringe of the bare facts. He doesn’t always succeeds in answering those questions, and in particular, without a solid knowledge of the issue, he ends up hitting singles when a hanging slow curve is thrown his way. If DRP is frustrated with the work that doesn’t come out of research, he should appreciate the frustration of the researchers when they see him fumble with the material they have provided him, material which he hasn’t taken the time to digest. When DRP knows an issue, he is stellar. That’s what makes it so particularly frustrating, knowing his capabilities when he is on top of the issue. DRP points with pride to his research staff in speeches and interviews; unfortunately, people don’t cast votes for the best research team; they vote for the best Premier.
In a way the T. V. show suffers from the same attitudinal problem. DRP decides to go in and get it over with. I see the T.V. program not only as a forum through which we raise DRP’s profile, but also as an opportunity for him to practice his television image technique. Those tapes, and as has been suggested by others, T.V. tapes from scrum and other interviews, should be reviewed with DRP with the focus being to improve his T.V. presence.
Sometimes we as a staff evaluate DRP’s performance in the House or in a scrum by the standard of whether it has been adequate. We should expect higher standards of ourselves and of him. We spend a lot of time looking for silver linings to every cloud. Surely the true strength of our mettle is the extent to which we accept the harshest criticism, digest it, analyze it and then decide whether it is valid or not and what action should follow. If the gallery thinks DRP’s questions were turkies, let’s at least deal with that perception, true or false as it may be, but not ignore it. I can understand we don’t want to demoralize the general staff and caucus by openly engaging in Mao-style self-criticism. But between ourselves and DRP we should be mature enough to handle it. At first the exchange may be “the press thought you stunk”, “well, give me a good question,” “but research doesn’t have time”, etc., etc. But surely there’s a level past a basic human: defensiveness where we can, as adults, analyze what went wrong: was it the question, the material, the delivery, and respond intelligently and productively. We are not perfect in our research and communications, and we are not like Star Trek’s Mr. Spock when it comes to analyzing our most personal skills (to the extent that our jobs are our lives) impersonally. But I would rather err on the side of being honest in our criticism rather than overplaying our praises.
I appreciate that this is all a dog’s work; it means swallowing some pride and doing something one doesn’t want to do. Again, it’s the discipline of the art.
Conclusion
I would never have set out to write this piece if I hadn’t thought it could serve some purpose. That purpose is not the automatic acceptance of the ideas presented here, for I could on many occasions have provided the counter-arguments to some of my points. On balance however, these are my views and my less than all-encompassing prescriptions.
The purpose of this paper is to start the process of reviewing and re-thinking the ways and means of our approach to our goals. The ultimate goal is that of forming a Liberal government. Whether my suggestions are the answer is at Jeast a beginning of the debate; without any discussion, if we continue along our current direction, we are simply waiting for the government to defeat itself. Some do, some don’t. I don’t want to leave it to chance.
