Part Two: From Task Force to Action: Executing Ontario’s Anti‑Drug Strategy

Ontario’s anti‑drug strategy emerged during a moment of intense public concern and political pressure. In the late 1980s, as noted in the previous article by Peggy Sweeney, the province was shaken by the tragic death of Benji Hayward, a loss that amplified fears about youth drug use. Additional context came from the United States. The U.S. was also deep into its high‑profile “War on Drugs.” President Ronald Reagan’s administration had embraced a tough, enforcement‑heavy approach, while First Lady Nancy Reagan toured the country urging young people to use the simplistic “Just Say No.” President George H. W. Bush later created a national “drug czar,” reinforcing the message that drugs were a crisis to be fought with force.

These actions and messages were crossing our border. The slogans were memorable, but the results were mixed. Ontario watched closely, determined to understand what was working—and what wasn’t.

Learning from the U.S., Without Copying It

Ken Black, who had chaired Ontario’s Task Force on Illegal Drug Use (Task Force), now stepped into a new role as Minister Responsible for the Anti‑Drug Strategy. His job was to turn the Task Force’s recommendations into action. But before doing so, we travelled to the U.S. to learn from American policymakers, law enforcement agencies and community organizations about their successes and failures over the last decade.

Some of what we saw was disquieting.

In Detroit, the FBI greeted the Ontario delegation with a dramatic display: a long boardroom table covered in seized semi‑automatic weapons. The message was blunt—drugs meant guns, guns meant violence, and violence demanded force. It was a powerful visual but only showed one side of the story.

New York City offered a more human, heartbreaking lesson. A treatment centre arranged for the team to meet a young African-American teenager who had shot his friend in a drug‑related incident. His story underscored how deeply drug use was tied to poverty, trauma, and systemic inequities. The warning was clear: without thoughtful prevention, Ontario could face similar challenges.

Black captured this reality during Question Period on November 20, 1989, when he reminded the Legislature that “money alone is not going to solve this problem,”¹ pointing to the billions spent in the U.S. since 1972 with little measurable improvement. Even after meeting with staff from President Bush’s drug czar, the conclusion was the same: Ontario needed a different approach. Many would argue that this remains true today.

A One-Size Solution Won’t Work

One of the clearest lessons from both American and Canadian experts was that there was no single model that consistently produced the best results. Canada had research into the extent of the problem but often lacked strong evaluation research as to what worked. Plus, communities across the province differed widely. What worked in downtown Toronto might not work in Thunder Bay or Windsor.

The Task Force had emphasized this reality, and Black was determined to honour it. Ontario’s strategy would focus on reducing demand and championing prevention—especially among youth. It would be flexible, community‑driven, and grounded in the belief that local leaders understood their own needs best.

Turning Recommendations into Reality

Implementing the Task Force’s recommendations was a complex undertaking. The province needed to coordinate across ministries, fund new initiatives, and demonstrate visible action to a public increasingly anxious about youth safety.

To manage this work, the government created the Anti‑Drug Secretariat, led by respected civil servant Dr. Jon Kelly. Under his guidance and with Black’s leadership, the Secretariat moved quickly to turn recommendations into a cohesive strategy and that strategy, into funded programs.

Three Pillars, One Foundation

Ontario’s Anti‑Drug Strategy rested on three core pillars:

1. Education and prevention programs
2. A wider range of treatment options
3. Expanded drug enforcement capacity

The foundation was reducing demand —early, community‑driven, and supported across sectors. By November 1989 during Drug Awareness Week, just one year after the Task Force report, Black announced the first major implementation steps. His message was inclusive and practical: everyone had a role to play.

Funding a Community‑Centred Response

The government committed $37 million to the Secretariat—a significant investment, though not enough to meet every need. The goal was to distribute funding in a way that respected local autonomy while ensuring provincial accountability and support. The Secretariat worked with community coalitions, including the Multi‑Faith Task Force on Substance Abuse, community action groups and the employee assistance program advisory committee, to support prevention‑focused activities and recommendations tailored to local realities.

During this time, Black received letters from community leaders and service providers pleading for treatment centres. Criticism emerged when Ontario funded treatment for some individuals in the U.S., highlighting gaps in local capacity.

We also identified several, at that time, high risk communities requiring a coordinated effort —North Bay, Toronto, North York, Windsor, Vanier, Manitoulin, and Sault Ste. Marie.

Early Momentum

Four months after the strategy launched, over half (16) of the task force’s 29 recommendations had already been acted upon. Highlights, but not a comprehensive list, included:

Education and Prevention

• The identified high risk communities received $4.5 million to plan, operate and evaluate community-based anti-drug programs.
  • Communities United Against Drugs Program: $3 million distributed to 35 community groups over two years, though demand from 115 communities far exceeded funding. These included unique initiatives such as an intervention and referral service for youth at Toronto’s bus terminal. As Black said in the media “We’re looking to form partnerships with the people in this province who want to get involved in fighting drugs…You come up with new concepts and tell us what kind of support you need to implement them and we’ll help.”²
• An additional $4.8 million toward youth prevention initiatives such as:
  • The anti-drug Stage Kids youth tour: A six‑month musical theatre‑based program visiting high schools in 22 communities. It often included a personal testimonial from a young recovering addict. As one 13-year old North Bay student commented after watching, “It was different because they each told a story. It’s different when this stuff is told to you by your parents or teachers. You understand more when you hear it from kids about your age and what they went through.”³ Follow-up also happened a month later to ensure lasting impact.
  • Youth forums: Six gatherings planned to hear directly from young people.
  • Dead Against Drugs slogan: used in the community grants program and the youth tour. Chosen through focus groups because it resonated with multiple audiences.
  • Educational videos: at a time when streaming didn’t exist, TVOntario, the Ministry of Education, and the Addiction Research Foundation collaborated on French and English videos for primary and secondary students. These could be used in schools and to assist with teacher training.

Treatment

• $1.6 million to expand 11 youth treatment programs, each with built‑in evaluation.
• $2 million in capital funding to the Donwood Institute, with a focus on women and youth.
• Critics argued it still wasn’t enough to reduce cross‑border treatment reliance.

Enforcement

• $5.6 million for 32 OPP officers and four support staff in eight communities.

These efforts complemented ongoing initiatives across multiple ministries, reflecting the strategy’s cross‑government nature.

Stopped Short but Others Continue

Ontario’s Anti‑Drug Strategy was never about a single program or slogan. It aimed – to use government speak here – to build a coordinated, evidence‑informed, community‑driven approach at a time when public pressure demanded fast action.

But this approach takes time rather than quick fixes. Those who work in the field know this. They deserve our thanks. They take on substance abuse jobs and tasks that are emotionally draining, often frustrating and require a personal commitment.

Many of the challenges Black identified in 1989 remain today. More sustained prevention, more youth‑focused intervention, more treatment and more training for those who work with young people were needed then—and likely, are still needed now.

Still, the strategy’s first year showed promise. And although an election stopped full implementation under the Liberal government, subsequent governments continued the work for another two years. The foundation had been laid.