The Accord negotiations

With no clear majority, the results of the 1985 provincial election created a rare and dramatic opportunity for a realignment in the province’s politics that would shape the next four decades in Ontario.

While the Progressive Conservatives (PCs), under Premier Frank Miller, won the most seats, they lost considerable ground in critical urban ridings, particularly Metro Toronto. The Liberal Party, led by David Peterson, and the New Democratic Party (NDP), led by Bob Rae, found themselves in a unique position to collaborate and end the PCs’ more than four-decade-long hold on government in the province.

The PCs entered the campaign as the incumbent but emerged with diminished authority. Their majority was lost, and their popular vote share collapsed by 14 percentage points in Metro Toronto. Miller, while publicly dignified in defeat, made an early misstep by suggesting separate school funding was responsible for the Tory loss, hinting that the party might back away from the commitment. This shook confidence among opposition parties and complicated Miller’s standing within his own caucus.

Bob Rae and the NDP had anticipated better results, but their campaign lacked organizational strength and energy. Holding 25 seats—barely above their 1981 result—they were disappointed but not without leverage. Rae indicated the party was open to discussion, suggesting a political opportunity lay ahead.

David Peterson’s Liberals recognized this chance. Despite finishing second, they saw the potential for cooperation with the NDP to create a stable government and implement their shared reformist agendas. In the days immediately following the election, informal contacts began between senior Liberal and NDP members to explore this possibility.

Strategic Calculations and the Beginning of Negotiations

Sean Conway, a senior Liberal and education critic, shifted from skepticism to enthusiasm about working with the NDP, particularly after Miller’s vacillations on education policy. By May 4, he sought out NDP MPP Richard Johnston to begin exploratory talks. The Liberals worried the Tories might quickly replace Miller, then argue for another election if defeated in the legislature—something that could delegitimize a Liberal-NDP agreement.

By May 7, Liberals were devising a package that might appeal to the NDP, including offering them the Speaker’s position and possibly a cabinet post. The goal was a legislative agreement lasting 18 months into the fall of 1986, enough time to pass key initiatives such as the separate school funding legislation.

Rae, aware of the federal NDP’s failure to gain credit for propping up Liberal Pierre Trudeau’s minority government in Ottawa between 1972–74, initially preferred a coalition. Peterson and Nixon, however, rejected that idea outright. They envisioned cooperation but not power-sharing.

The NDP caucus was divided. Some wanted a full coalition, others preferred issue-by-issue support, and a third faction opposed cooperation with Liberals entirely. By May 8, conversations had advanced, but the NDP emphasized their interest in a policy-based agreement rather than appointments or positions.

Crafting the Liberal-NDP Accord

Negotiating teams were formed: Conway, Robert Nixon, and Ian Scott for the Liberals joined by Hershell Ezrin, Peterson’s principal secretary; MPPs Ross McClellan, Mike Breaugh, and staffer Hugh Mackenzie for the NDP. The PCs, desperate to hang on, appointed a team including MPPs Robert Elgie, Larry Grossman, and  John Tory who had worked for former premier William Davis to woo the NDP.

However, as Liberal-NDP talks progressed, a comprehensive platform emerged. It outlined shared priorities such as banning extra billing by doctors, full funding for Catholic schools, freedom of information legislation, environmental reforms, daycare expansion, job creation initiatives, and procedural changes in the legislature. These were all part of the Liberal election platform and broadly aligned with the policies the NDP had also campaigned on.

The Liberals also considered offering committee chair roles to NDP MPPs and even floated the idea of Donald MacDonald, a former NDP leader, chairing Ontario Hydro. A proposal to depoliticize senior public appointments was also under consideration.

By May 13, both parties were finalizing the terms. A deal announcement was expected by the weekend of May 18–19. The plan was for the legislature to reconvene, Miller to present a Throne Speech, and the government to be defeated by a combined Liberal-NDP vote.

Finalizing the Deal, Conservative Missteps

While the Liberals and NDP moved steadily toward agreement, Miller attempted to salvage his government. A May 24 meeting between Conservatives and NDP negotiators proved fruitless—no offers were made, and the meeting was described by one NDP participant as “the weirdest” they’d ever attended.

Still, the PCs proceeded with the formalities, appointing a new cabinet on May 21 and preparing a Throne Speech for early June. The final Liberal-NDP accord was approved by both caucuses on May 27 and publicly released the next day. To preserve the appearance of a Liberal-led government, there was no joint signing ceremony.

Rae met briefly with Lieutenant-Governor John Black Aird and presented the accord. He emphasized the NDP’s intention to vote against Miller and their confidence in Peterson to lead a stable government.

The accord, titled An Agenda for Reform: Proposals for Minority Parliament, had three components:

1. Legislative Reform: Including a new freedom of information and privacy act, reforms to public appointments and election finance rules.

2. Immediate Legislative Priorities: Confirming separate school funding, tenant protections, health and safety laws, and labor arbitration rights.

3. Long-Term Goals: Promoting affirmative action, built co-op housing, combated acid rain, improved eldercare services, supported farmers, and recognized daycare as a public service.

Conservative Resistance and Legislative Showdown

The Miller government delivered a Throne Speech on June 4 that appeared to abandon most of its campaign platform. The speech promised job creation, environmental protection, rent controls, and full school funding—many of which Miller had opposed just weeks earlier in a last ditch attempt to get NDP support that would derail the Accord..

Peterson dismissed it as a “deathbed repentance,” while Rae ridiculed the about-face, calling it a “technicolour dream” full of  policies that the PCs had mocked as “dumb socialist ideas” during the campaign. Rae and Peterson each introduced amendments to the motion on the Speech from the Throne, explicitly stating the Miller government had lost the legislature’s confidence.

Public opinion backed the Liberal-NDP alliance. A Goldfarb Consultants poll in the Toronto Star showed the Liberals at 43%, PCs at 34%, and NDP at 24%. Peterson was the preferred premier by 61% of respondents.

On June 18, the motion of non-confidence passed 72–52. The Lieutenant-Governor then asked Peterson to form a government, noting that while the accord was not legally binding, it was a sufficient political basis to assure a reasonable period of stability.

Controversy and Questions of Legitimacy

The Liberal-NDP accord was not universally accepted. Critics argued that the PCs, having won the most seats, deserved to govern. Others worried about the influence granted to the NDP with only 25 seats and warned of legislative dysfunction. Some painted the deal as a cynical political ploy rather than principled governance.

Despite those concerns, most editorial voices were positive. The Windsor Star praised the accord’s swift formation, negotiation skill, and constructive goals.

A New Government and Early Impact

The symbolic swearing-in of Peterson’s cabinet took place on June 26 on the lawn at Queen’s Park in front of 5,000 people. The ceremony emphasized inclusivity and change, with a cabinet reflecting Toronto’s diversity and gender balance. Peterson walked on foot through the crowd, signaling a people-first government.

Though the Liberals formed a minority government supported by the NDP, they functioned with surprising smoothness. Polls by October 1985 showed the Liberals up 10 percentage points from their election result. The NDP held steady, and the PCs finally stopped dismissing the result as a fluke.

Still, governing wasn’t without friction. Doctors went on strike over the extra billing ban. Lawyers were angry about the end of Queen’s Counsel titles. Catholic school funding drew fire from public school boards. Business leaders opposed equal pay for work of equal value and labor reforms, while OPSEU, the union representing provincial pubic servants was frustrated by slow movement on extending political rights.

Yet by mid-1987, the legislature had passed 117 bills, many of them aligned with the accord. Columnists and political observers acknowledged the success of the minority arrangement, noting that legislative debate and compromise had strengthened policymaking.

Rae, once concerned about the NDP’s relevance, took satisfaction in the party’s strengthened profile. Contrary to early fears, the party didn’t fade—it emerged stronger, eventually leading to the 1990 election win that made Rae Ontario’s first NDP premier.

Legacy of the 1985 Accord

The 1985 Liberal-NDP accord represented a pivotal moment in Ontario politics. It marked the end of the PCs’ 42-year rule and introduced a new era of policy-driven, cooperative governance. While controversial at the time, the arrangement ultimately provided legislative stability, advanced progressive reforms, and reshaped Ontario’s political landscape.

For Peterson, it was a springboard to eventual electoral majority in 1987. For Rae and the NDP, it proved the value—of pragmatic collaboration as the NDP became the Official Opposition in the 1987 vote. And for Ontario, it was a dramatic, symbolic end to an era of one-party dominance and the beginning of a more contested, dynamic political era.